The Internet of Things (IoT) 
INTRODUCTION
This is the age of the Internet of Things (IoT), where "everyday objects . . . connect to the Internet and . . . send and receive data."
1 The lines between computers and humans have blurred as " [t] he Internet now affects the world in a direct physical manner."
2 The Federal Trade Commission predicts that more than fifty billion devices will be part of the IoT by 2020, 3 including items ranging from kitchen appliances to Fitbits and heart monitors. 4 As Bruce Schneier explained to Congress, "everything is now a computer." 5 The reach of the IoT extends beyond consumer goods to major items and infrastructure components, including cars, airplanes, 6 hospitals, telecommunications networks, and power grids. 7 As a result, "insecurity" in the IoT "puts human safety at risk." 8 Moreover, in the age of the IoT, the actions of "hackers" may carry physical consequences.
9
This article proceeds as follows. Section I describes episodes in which the IoT has already been hacked as well as the potential for other 1 Fu"] (warning the HECC that "the Dyn attack is a sign of worse pains to come"). 9 See section I, infra. [Vol. 16 1.4 million cars in response to a widely publicized demonstration where hackers took control of a Jeep Cherokee through its infotainment system. 25 They were able to "turn the steering wheel, briefly disable the brakes and shut down the engine." 26 Additionally, in 2010, the disgruntled former employee of a used-car dealership remotely accessed the company's computers and wreaked havoc by setting off car alarms and shutting down engines. 27 The danger is not limited to cars. For example, in 2008, a fourteenyear-old boy hacked into the system controlling the trains of Lodz, Poland as a prank. 28 He made several trains change tracks, causing multiple derailments and injuries. 29 In 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security "issued a warning" about "several . . . attacks against the 911 system." 30 The attacks were an attempt to extort money, and when the perpetrators received nothing they "launched [a] high volume of calls against the target network, tying up the system from receiving legitimate calls." 31 In 2016, Iranian hackers breached "the computer-guided controls" of the small Bowman Dam in suburban Rye any computer system, can be hacked, leaving the car vulnerable to infection by malware. These vulnerabilities pose serious safety hazards should they be exploited nefariously. Legal implications of this technological vulnerability have yet to be adequately addressed."). Cars contain dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) "embedded in the body, doors, dash, roof, trunk, seats, wheels, navigation equipment, and entertainment centers," many of which connect to the internet and provide access points for hackers. Id. Disturbingly, " [t] he potential vulnerability of cars to hacking will increase as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and self-driving cars become available" and "the average auto maker is about 20 years behind software companies in understanding how to prevent cyber attacks." Id. at 3. 25 Kelly Pleskot, FCA Recalls 1.4 Million Vehicles over Hacking Concern, MOTORTREND, Jul. 24, 2015, http://www.motortrend.com/news/fca-recalls-1-4-million-vehicles-over-hacking-concern/. 26 Craig Timberg, Hacks on the Highway, WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 22, 2015, at 3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/07/22/hacks-on-thehighway/?utm_term=.f074b322c45a. 27 Id. at 7; Matthew Shaer, Disgruntled Hacker Remotely Disables 100 Cars, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2010, at 1, http://www.csmonitor.com/ Technology/Horizons/2010/0318/ Disgruntled-hacker-remotely-disables-100-cars. 28 Graeme Baker, Schoolboy Hacks into City's Tram System, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1575293/Schoolboy-hacksinto-citys-tram-system.html. 29 Id. 30 Kim Zetter, How America's 911 Emergency Response System Can Be Hacked, WASHINGTON POST: THE SWITCH, Sept. 9, 2016, at 1, https://www.washington post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/09/how-americas-911-emergency-responsesystem-can-be-hacked/?utm_term=.9cfcc5fc5a3d. 31 Id. (internal citation omitted).
Brook, New York. 32 The dam was offline for repair and immune to remote access, but the implications are disturbing because the hackers may have been trying to access an identically named dam in Oregon, which is a formidable "245 feet tall and 800 feet long . . . ." 33 
B. Other Ways the IoT Could Be Hacked
Machine Security researchers have identified a range of other frightening vulnerabilities. Researchers have "demonstrated ransomware against home thermostats and exposed vulnerabilities in implanted medical devices. They've hacked voting machines and power plants." 34 Indeed, many computer security experts fear that the USB port at an airline seat could potentially be used to control the plane's avionics. 35 Clearly, the IoT offers a broad array of dangerous tools hackers can employ for a wide range of motives, including: terrorism, 36 "national aggression," 37 pranking, 38 election tampering, 39 and monetary extortion.
40
Whatever the impetus for hacking in the IoT, the threats moving forward are considerable. 33 Id. 34 Schneier, supra note 2, at 5. Although there is evidence of Russian hacking intended to affect the U.S. presidential election in 2016, these efforts seem to have been focused on the computers themselves and information contained on them (e.g., emails and donor databases), rather than on things connected to the computers, such as voting machines. But see David Smith & John Swain, Russian Agents Hacked US Voting System Manufacturer Before U.S. Election, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2017, at 1 (noting that although hacking and release of Democratic emails had been traced to Russia vote counting "was thought to be unaffected" before leaked report that Russian intelligence hacked into U.S. manufacturer of voting systems weeks before election). 35 Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 102. 36 See generally Balough, supra note 24, at 1 (theorizing about the possibility that cars might be exploited for terrorism through the internet). 37 Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 57. 38 See Baker, supra note 28 & 29, and accompanying text (chronicling a hacking attack executed as a prank). 39 See generally Bruce Schneier, American Elections Will Be Hacked, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/opinion/american-electionswill-be-hacked.html (summarizing the vulnerabilities of voting machines and infrastructure and the danger of election fraud). 40 See Drew, supra note 23, at 3 ("The primary motivation for [DDoS] attacks appears to be financial").
II. WHY IS THE IOT SO INSECURE AND VULNERABLE TO HACKING?
Security researchers have attributed the scale and ease of attack to "the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of unwitting consumers," 41 and to a "fundamental market failure." 42 Because electronics consumers care most about affordability, "the market has prioritized features and cost over security."
43 Thus, the teams that make many IoT devices have less "security expertise" than major companies like Apple, because "the market won't stand for the additional costs that [similar training] would require." 44 Further complicating matters, many IoT devices are part of a complex global supply chain where they are "designed and built offshore, then rebranded and resold." 45 The resulting devices are the product of differing international standards of security.
46
As a result, IoT devices in the U.S. exhibit a wide range of serious vulnerabilities. Many come with "default and easily-identifiable passwords that hackers can exploit."
47 Some of these passwords cannot be changed.
48
Similarly, many "devices also lack the capability of updating their firmware, forcing consumers to monitor for and install updates themselves." 49 Additionally, in many cases consumers have little or no way to know when their IoT devices have been compromised. 50 The relationship between hardware and software further exacerbates the problem. When the underlying software has been corrupted, the object itself often continues to function as intended, leaving little reason to replace it. 51 Even devices used as part of a botnet in an attack will "still work fine." 52 Many objects 41 See Fu, supra note 8, at 4 ("What's new is the scale and ease of attack because of the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of unwitting consumers."). 42 Schneier, supra note 2, at 3. 43 Id. This section explores the interaction between the IoT and the current legal regime. Subsection A discusses whether current laws prohibit hacking with an intent to control an object. Subsection B explores the problem of botnets. This section concludes that hacking in the IoT will often be illegal, though the existing laws punish conduct after the fact without addressing the vulnerabilities that facilitate hacking.
A. Scenario One: Hacking with the Intention of Controlling an Object
Consider the following hypothetical. Bill has a grudge against his neighbor Jeremy. Bill discovers a security vulnerability in one of the many electronic control units (ECUs) of Jeremy's late model sedan, 54 and he hacks in through the internet and enters commands that enable him to take control of Jeremy's car. 55 Bill's actions are increasingly plausible as cars become ever more connected and automakers struggle to update outmoded software. 56 The hypothetical identifies a fundamental aspect of the IoT: the hackers' target is not the computer, but the object connected to the computer. This is true of many of the examples outlined above, though the motives varied: the fourteen-year-old hacked a train system for a prank; the Iranians hacked a dam apparently as an act of terrorism; the extortionists attacked the 911 system for money; and the disgruntled employee hacked into cars sold by his former employer for revenge. All sought to achieve their goals by controlling a remotely accessible object in the IoT. 57 In the IoT, a major objective of remote access will be to control the "things." Thus, a key question is whether the current legal regime covers this relatively new threat, governing scenarios like the one involving Bill and Jeremy. It does. 53 Id. at 3-4 (identifying the problem of longevity in internet enabled devices including cars, refrigerators, and thermostats). 54 Such vulnerabilities are apparently not hard to track down. See Timberg, supra note 26. ("[S]ecurity researchers" discovered "readily accessible Internet links to thousands of other privately owned Jeeps, Dodges and Chryslers . . . ."). 55 The exact form of hacking varies based on the specific ECU: "[s]ome entry points to a car's ECUs require a direct hard-wired connection, while others can be accessed wirelessly, including Wi-Fi or [Radio-frequency identification]." Balough supra note 24, at 1. Researchers demonstrated that once a vehicle has been started normally, key functions including the engine, brakes, and transmission can be controlled remotely by "typing on a MacBook Pro." Timberg, supra note 26. 56 Timberg, supra note 26. 57 See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The most obvious law that can be employed to combat hacking with the intent to control an object is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"). The CFAA was "[o]riginally designed as a criminal statute aimed at deterring and punishing hackers, particularly those who attack computers used for compelling federal interests," 58 but it also includes "a trespass-like civil remedy under federal law" for various forms of hacking. 59 It is logical that the law would cover hacking with an intent to control an object, as there is some evidence that Congress passed the CFAA in response to the movie WarGames, 60 where the protagonist accidentally hacks into the computer controlling America's nuclear weaponry and nearly starts a third world war.
61
The provisions of the CFAA cover a range of conduct. The Act prohibits:
(1) unauthorized obtaining of national security information; (2) unauthorized obtaining of information from a financial institution, United States department or agency, or from any protected computer; (3) unauthorized access to government computers; (4) computer fraud; (5) computer damage; (6) passwords trafficking; and (7) computer extortion.
62
Section 1030(a)(5) is the subsection most likely to cover hacking with an intent to control an object. Whether §1030(a)(5) prohibits hacking with an intent to control hinges on four key definitions: (1) "transmission," (2) "computer," (3) "protected computer," and (4) "damage."
"Transmission" encompasses a range of hacking activities, such as "[t]he transfer of operation or confidential information," "malicious software updates," "code injection attacks," DDoS, and the "embedding of malicious code" or malware. 64 Under the CFAA, transmission "can be accomplished either over the Internet or through a physical medium such as a compact disc." 65 This would cover many forms of hacking aimed at controlling an object. To return to the example of Bill and Jeremy, Bill's conduct qualifies, as he transmitted commands via the internet to take control of Jeremy's car.
Within the CFAA, "computer" is an expansive term. It is defined as "an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device . . . ."
66
As Judge Easterbrook explained, the definition of "computer" in the CFAA is an example where the exclusions from the definition "show just how general" that definition is. 67 Indeed, CFAA subsection (e)(1) "carves out automatic typewriters, typesetters, and handheld calculators; this shows that other devices with embedded processors and software are covered." 68 Thus, most IoT devices are computers for purposes of the CFAA. The ECUs that Bill hacked in Jeremy's car certainly would qualify, as they "are high speed data processing devices performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions." 69 Many IoT devices are also protected computers. The CFAA defines protected computers as not only those "exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government" but also computers that are "used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication . This standard included the afflicted computer in Mitra-Madison, Wisconsin's "computer-based radio system for police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency communications" 72 -even though the hacker's "interference did not affect any radio system on the other side of a state line." 73 What mattered was that Madison's computerized radio system "operated on spectrum licensed by the FCC" and therefore implicated interstate commerce.
74
Mitra is not an exception. Particularly relevant for devices that are part of the IoT, "[c]ourts generally hold that because the Internet and interstate commerce are inexorably intertwined, any computer connected to the Internet should be considered a computer affecting interstate commerce and therefore protected." 75 Thus, if Jeremy's ECU is internet-enabled, it is a protected computer under the CFAA. This seems a safe bet in an era where cars are increasingly connected and can "talk to the outside world through remote key systems, satellite radios, telematic control units, Bluetooth connections, dashboard internet links and even wireless tirepressure monitors." 76 "Damage" is "defined as 'any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information,'" 77 and almost certainly encompasses hacking with the intent of controlling an object. 78 To begin with, a hacker damages a computer under the statute by forcing it to behave in a manner not intended by its owner. 79 Transmission is damage under the CFAA because it frequently "involves the deletion of computer data or files."
81 Clearly, Bill damaged Jeremy's car under the CFAA, since he caused it to behave contrary to the wishes of its owner.
Finally, CFAA penalties are structured in a manner that enhances punishment depending on the outcome of the hacking. The Act provides harsher penalties for those whose hacking causes "physical injury," "a threat to public health or safety," "damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States government in furtherance of justice, national defense, or national security," damage to at least ten computers within a year, or "modification or impairment . . . of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals . . . ." 82 Unsurprisingly, the stiffest retribution is reserved for those who "knowingly or recklessly caus[e] death from conduct in violation of" subsection (a)(5)(a). 83 Depending on the nature and results of Bill's hacking, he may be subject to some of these increased CFAA penalties. For example, if he took control of Jeremy's car while it was hurtling down a busy highway, it is easy to imagine how Bill might have threatened public safety. If Jeremy's car crashed as a result of the hacking, Bill would face steeper sentencing under the CFAA if Jeremy were injured or killed.
There are many other laws that could govern hacking with an intent to control an object. These include state laws similar to the CFAA. 84 subversive conduct or acts contrary to what the system owner or privilege grantor intended."). 80 Id. 81 
B. Scenario Two: Botnets
As discussed in Section I, a botnet is a network of compromised computers, "often programmed to complete a set of repetitive tasks" without "the owner's knowledge or permission." 85 Botnets "are the instrumentality through which substantial amounts of cybercrime takes place."
86 Botnet-based cybercrime includes spam, fraud, and-of particular relevance for the IoT-DDoS and the installation of malware. 87 Hackers used a botnet in the Dyn attack, which prompted the HECC hearing (discussed in Section I) about the dangers of hacking in the IoT. 89 See Kesan supra note 60 at 493 ("The CFAA's language is very broad and can be read to prohibit the creation of botnets."). 90 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012). 91 See Kesan, supra note 60 at 442-444 (explaining how botnets are created). 92 See Lerner, supra note 14, at 244 ("CFAA enforcement requires precise knowledge of the defendant's identity, which is often impossible to obtain in DDoS attacks . . . [In addition] CFAA prosecution of DDoS masters in foreign countries is impeded by a number of jurisdictional obstacles."). 93 See, e.g, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Arizona Man Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison for Selling Access to Botnets, JUSTICE NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/arizona-man-sentenced-30-months-prisonselling-access-botnets (describing successful prosecution of a man who had sold "access to and use of thousands of malware-infected computers").
the IoT. First, attribution is very difficult. It poses technical problems and often requires remote electronic searches. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 2016 to remove some procedural barriers to remote electronic searches. But the amendments-and remote searches in general-have been controversial. As we discuss in more detail below in subsection B, Critics have voiced a variety of concerns, including Fourth Amendment and privacy objections. These issues will likely be raised in prosecutions that rely on evidence secured by means of remote electronic searches, and there are ongoing efforts to repeal the amendments. Moreover, when IoT hacking originates outside the United States, those prosecutions will raise the question whether the CFAA provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Despite all of these difficulties, there have been some successful investigations, allowing the government to prosecute hackers and neutralize their botnets.
94

A. Attribution
Reliable attribution of most forms of computer hacking is extremely difficult. 95 As Professor Orin Kerr explained, investigating computer crimes is necessarily different than investigating traditional physical offenses:
With the physical crime, the chances were good that the crime scene would yield substantial leads. Even if no one could identify [the perpetrator] in a lineup, his physical presence at the crime scene greatly narrowed the number of suspects. The electronic crime scene looks very different. In most cases, evidence gathered at the victim site will tell the investigator only that someone, located somewhere in the world, hacked into the [victim's computer]. In most cases, the biggest investigative lead comes in the form of an originating Internet Protocol (IP) address recorded by the [victim's] servers. An IP address is the internet equivalent of a telephone number . . . . Because hackers typically route their attacks through a series of intermediaries, investigators must "try to follow the trail of electronic bread crumbs" back to the perpetrator's computer, a cumbersome process. 97 Moreover, hackers intentionally target intermediary computers with lax security and poor record keeping, meaning that the trail is likely to break down. 98 When that occurs, investigators must use other techniques, such as prospective surveillance.
99
These difficulties are compounded in cases involving multiple computers. Attribution is especially difficult in the case of crossjurisdictional botnet cases, which may involve one million or more computers from many nations. 100 The perpetrator may be an individual, but it may also be a business entity or a foreign government agency. 101 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, other U.S. government agencies, and private organizations are attempting to improve their capacity to meet these challenges. 102 In some cases, the government has collaborated with the private sector.
103
Anonymizing technology adds another layer to this already complicated attribution problem. For example, Tor is a private global computer network that allows users to conduct anonymous transactions without revealing their location. 104 As one commentator explained:
Computers on the Tor Network use an encrypted communications protocol that cannot be accessed using normal web browsers. Instead, they require the use of special software, like the Tor Browser. governments to trace the location of computers hosting "hidden" websites on the network, the location of computers accessing those hidden websites, or the location of computers that tunnel through the network to "anonymously" visit public websites on the World Wide Web. 105 Tor bounces message packets through a series of intermediate computers (proxies) scattered around the globe, making it impossible for government investigators to determine the location of the original sender.
106
B. Remote Electronic Searches
When a physical search is not possible because anonymizing technology has hidden the location of electronic storage media, the government may be able to conduct a remote electronic search of the media to seize or copy electronically stored information. Although searches of this nature are a common feature of hacking investigations, they raise a variety of ethical and legal issues. Some of the issues were addressed in 2016 by amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These amendments generated substantial controversy, and the constitutional issues raised by critics of remote searches will need to be resolved on a case-bycase basis when warrant applications are presented for judicial approval or evidence obtained by the use of such warrants is introduced at trial. And some commentators have urged Congress to limit remote electronic searches.
Remote electronic searches employ network investigative techniques (NITs) that allow investigators to reach a computer without knowledge of its physical location. 107 A remote search requires only a means of communicating with the target computer, such as an active email address. 108 For example, an NIT may be an email containing software that can extract from the target computer and relay back information such as the target computer's IP address, its host name, media access control (MAC) address, time zone, and registered computer name, registered company name, and current logged-in user name. 109 The government has employed [Vol. 16
other NITs as well. 110 Although the lower courts have been divided on this issue, several courts have concluded that NITs constitute searches for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment when the government obtains information (such as the defendant's IP address) not from a third party provider, but rather from an intrusion into the defendant's computer.
111
In 2014, the Department of Justice recommended that the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to "update the provisions relating to the territorial limits for searches of electronic storage media."
112
The Department sought amendments to deal with "two increasingly common situations (1) where the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be searched but the district within which that computer is located is unknown, and (2) where the investigation requires law enforcement to coordinate searches of numerous computers in numerous districts."
113 Additionally, the Department noted that the provisions for notice following a search had not been adapted to address remote searches. 114 The Department explained that when persons committing criminal offenses have used anonymizing technology, like Tor, the territorial limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 could prevent the issuance of warrants for remote searches although the government had met all of the http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committeerules-criminal-procedure-november-2014. 110 For example, after the government seized the server for the "Playpen" child pornography website, it obtained a warrant to install an NIT on the server consisting of software to be deployed when any user logged into the site with a username and password, regardless of the user's physical location. The NIT would then force the "activating" computer to transmit information back to the FBI, including: the IP address of the activating computer; the date and time the NIT determined the IP address; a unique identifier generated by the NIT to distinguish data from different activating computers; the type of operating system running on the activating computer, including type, version, and architecture; information on whether the NIT had already been delivered to the activating computer; the "host name" of the activating computer; the operating system used by the activating computer; and the Media Access Control ("MAC") address of the activating computer. 111 prior to the 2016 amendment Rule 41 authorized "a magistrate judge with authority in a district" to issue warrants to search for and seize "property located within the district." 116 But anonymizing technology like Tor disguises the location of the storage media or information to be searched. Thus under a strict reading of the rule, disguising the district in which the computer was located precluded any court from issuing a warrant, even if the government had presented probable cause and met all of the other statutory and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant. 117 The government would be unable to obtain venue in any district, regardless of the seriousness of the offense. 118 The venue or territorial limitation for the issuance of warrants also imposed a particularly heavy burden in botnet investigations, where the affected computers (and other IoT devices that would be classed as computers under the CFAA) are often located in all ninety-four federal districts. Although the information establishing probable cause would be virtually identical in each district, presenting this information in each 115 Before amendment, Rule 41(b) authorized search warrants for property located outside the judge's district in only four situations: (1) for property in the district that might be removed before execution of the warrant; (2) for tracking devices installed in the district, which may be monitored outside the district; (3) for investigations of domestic or international terrorism; and (4) for property located in a U.S. territory or a U.S. diplomatic or consular mission. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)-(5 Finally, before amendment, the notice provisions of Rule 41 were ill-adapted to remote electronic searches. 120 The rule required the officer executing the warrant to give a copy of the warrant and receipt for any property seized "to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant or receipt at the place where the officer took the property." 121 This language seemed to contemplate leaving the warrant and receipt at a physical place, which would not be feasible for remote electronic searches.
After a period of notice and comment on proposed revisions, 122 and a public hearing 123 on draft amendments, the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rule 41 that addressed the problems with venue and made explicit provision for the notice to be provided after remote electronic searches.
124 When "technological means," such as Tor, had been used to conceal the location of the media or information, the proposed amendment authorized the issuance of a warrant by "a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to the crime may have occurred." 125 Additionally, in CFAA investigations under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), such as botnet investigations, the amendment authorized the government to seek a single warrant when protected computers had been damaged in five or more districts. 126 Finally, the amendment added a new provision regarding notice for remote electronic searches, which required the officer conducting the search to "make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and receipt on the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was seized or copied."
127 It also allowed service to be After review by the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, the proposed amendments were submitted to Congress, 129 which took no action and allowed them to go into effect December 1, 2016.
130
The amendments have generated substantial opposition. Although a variety of other concerns were also raised during the public notice and comment period, 131 "[t]he most common theme in the comments opposing the amendments was a concern that they relaxed or undercut the protections for personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."
132 Critics expressed concern that warrants issued pursuant to the proposed rules would not meet the particularity and notice requirements, would be exceptionally intrusive, destructive, and dangerous, and yet largely insulated from judicial review. 133 Several commentators urged that changes of this nature were not appropriate for rulemaking because they raised policy issues that should be resolved by Congress. 134 Finally, some commentators also urged that the amendments would improperly allow extraterritorial searches in violation of 128 Id. The Advisory Committee concluded that these constitutional and policy arguments raised substantive issues that were not germane to its task under the Rules Enabling Act, 137 and should be resolved by the courts on a case-by-case basis, or by Congress. The Department of Justice had brought to the Committee's attention a procedural problem that was impairing its ability to investigate serious computer crimes. In the Committee's view, its task was to remove a barrier created by the Rules (not the Constitution), and to allow the courts to rule on constitutional issues if (and when) they were raised by particular warrant applications.
138
The amendment would facilitate judicial review and the development of applicable constitutional standards by allowing the government to seek warrants, rather than conducting exigent warrantless searches. 139 Broad policy questions-such as whether additional non-constitutional limitations should be imposed on 135 Id. at 13-15. 136 Subcommittee chair and members characterizing many of the objections to the amendments as substantive, not procedural, noting Committee's responsibility under the Rules Enabling Act to address new procedural problem (such as the venue gap), and observing that providing venue for warrant applications would allow caselaw on the constitutional issues to develop in an orderly fashion, shedding light on the issues should Congress wish to legislate). The Advisory Committee addressed this point in the Committee Note, which provides:
The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media or seizing or copying electronically stored information, leaving the application of this and other constitutional standards to ongoing case law development. remote searches to protect privacy-are substantive, not procedural, and accordingly they would fall outside the rulemaking authority conferred by the Rules Enabling Act. Congress would be the appropriate body to weigh the competing policy concerns and consider whether legislation should be enacted. 140 Finally, the Committee was not persuaded by the argument that the amendment would authorize the courts to issue extraterritorial searches in violation of international law.
141
Post-amendment scholarship has renewed and developed more fully the Fourth Amendment issues, 142 and produced a debate about whether Rule 41 authorizes searches that raise foreign relations and international law concerns. One recent article argued that searches authorized by the amendments to Rule 41 violate other nations' sovereignty, which offends customary international law and disrupts foreign relations.
143 But other 140 See Committee Report at 13-14 (noting that many of the objections to the proposed amendments "were about substantive limits on government searches, which are not affected by the proposed amendment"); Minutes at 3, 5 (comments of Judge Kethledge) (subcommittee chair's characterization of many objections to the amendments as substantive, not procedural), 6 (comments of Judge Sutton) (noting that approving venue for searches was not approving remote electronic searches; rather, it permits litigation "that will shed light on the process and the issues," and noting that under the Rules Enabling Act the judiciary's role is to promulgate rules, to which Congress reacts). 141 See Raman letter at 4-5 (citations omitted), stating:
In light of the presumption against international extraterritorial application, and consistent with the existing language of Rule 41(b)(3), this amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that authorize the search of electronic storage media located in a foreign country or countries. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches of the property of non-United States persons outside the United States, and the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to searches of United States persons outside the United States. Instead, extraterritorial searches of United States persons are subject to the Fourth Amendment's "basic requirement of reasonableness." Under this proposed amendment, law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the electronic media to be searched are within the United States or where the location of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should the media searched prove to be outside the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the search.
scholars disagreed, noting "the pervasive nature of transnational law enforcement cooperation generally and the existing practice of government cooperation and coordination in dark web investigations specifically," and challenging the claim that the use of NITs in this context would violate international law.
144
The law governing remote electronic searches is still in its infancy. Because Rule 41(b)(6) now provides venue for remote electronic searches, it has opened the courthouse door not only to applications seeking these warrants, but also to litigation challenging particular searches on constitutional grounds. This litigation will allow the development of precedents that will clarify-and may limit-remote electronic searches. There may also be legislative developments. Bills have been introduced in both houses to repeal the amendments to Rule 41, 145 and Congress may eventually develop a framework to regulate remote electronic searches, as it did with wiretaps. 146 The imposition of additional limits on remote searches could have a significant impact on the government's ability to prosecute hacking, given the practical necessity to use remote searches to identify hackers. States territory.
C. Jurisdiction to Prosecute Extraterritorial Conduct
149
Although the U.S. also recognizes prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon nationality, active and passive personality, the protective principle, and universal jurisdiction, 150 the question whether a particular crime will have extraterritorial application must be determined by the courts. This determination is subject to a presumption in favor of domestic application of U.S. laws and against extraterritoriality. In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has reemphasized and strengthened the presumption against extraterritoriality, raising the question whether the CFAA will be construed to have extraterritorial effect.
Statutory Construction and Extraterritoriality
In United States v. Bowman, a decision from 1922, the Supreme Court indicated that some offenses are not subject to the presumption against extraterritorial application. The Court recognized that crimes "affect[ing] the peace and good order of the community," such as murder, robbery, and arson, are presumed to be territorial. 151 Other crimes, however, are "not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated," and they are not presumed to be territorial. 152 In the intervening decades, that lower courts understood Bowman to mean "a substantial number of . . extraterritoriality: absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application. 156 In justifying this presumption, the Court emphasized the need to avoid international discord 157 or friction, as well as the "common sense" view that Congress ordinarily focuses on domestic matters. 158 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Bowman, it is doubtful whether that case is still good law. Initially, many courts and commentators concluded that Bowman had not been overruled or limited. 159 But the Court's decision in a RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 160 a civil suit brought under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, 161 cast serious doubt on the Supreme Court's continued adherence to Bowman. The Court first considered the question whether the criminal provisions of RICO itself (and various federal crimes that are RICO predicate offenses) have extraterritorial effect. 162 The Court drew no distinction between civil and criminal statutes. In determining the reach of these offenses, the Court applied the presumption against exterritorial effect, citing its prior decisions in civil cases. 163 It stated:
The question is not whether we think "Congress would have wanted" a statute to apply to foreign conduct "if it had thought of the situation before the court," but whether Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so. When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." 164 The Court did not discuss or even cite the Bowman decision, but this passage can be read as repudiating the Bowman approach. As one commentator stated, "the Court seemed to take direct aim at Bowman without naming it," 165 and the American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations (Fourth) treats the presumption against extraterritoriality as fully applicable to criminal statutes.
Construing the CFAA
The CFAA would be severely hamstrung if it were not applicable to foreign-based hacking, and there is some evidence that Congress intended the CFAA to have extraterritorial application. But it is not clear whether the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Congress "clearly and unmistakably" directed that result. Thus, the CFAA could provide the test case to determine whether the strong presumption developed in civil cases will be applied with the same rigor in construing criminal statutes, particularly those involving crimes that inherently cross borders. The balance of interests may be calculated differently in civil and criminal cases, since the Executive Branch, which controls foreign relations, is also responsible for the discretionary determination whether to prosecute cases that may have foreign relations implications.
Only one district court has considered whether the CFAA provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and that decision predated the Supreme Court's decision in RJR Nabisco. In United States v. Ivanov 167 the defendant, who was physically in Russia, hacked into the computer system of a financial-transaction clearinghouse using an internet service provider located in the state of Washington. Noting the detrimental effect of the conduct occurred in the United States, 168 the court concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction and turned to the question whether the CFAA provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction. It recognized the presumption against extraterritoriality, but found that Congress "clearly manifested its intention" to give the CFAA extraterritorial effect. 169 The Ivanov court focused on several changes made by Congress in 1996. Although the changes to the text focused on defining which computers were protected and what conduct was prohibited, the legislative history indicates the Senate was concerned about foreign-based hackers. As the Ivanov court noted, the 1996 amendments revised the definition of "protected computer" to include a computer used in "foreign commerce or communication," added subsections dealing with "interstate or foreign commerce," and defined the term "government entity" to include foreign governments.
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Foreign commerce, in this context, "must mean international" commerce. 171 The legislative history, moreover, suggests that Congress intended the CFAA to apply to foreign-based hackers. As the court noted, the Senate Judiciary Committee "specifically noted its concern distinction between civil and criminal or private and public enforcement, and concluding Bowman can be read to be consistent with more recent cases). 167 Under the Supreme Court's recent decisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is not clear whether other courts will follow Ivanov. On the one hand, courts construing the CFAA will be well aware that construing it to apply only to conduct that occurs in the United States would severely limit its effectiveness. However, it is doubtful whether a brief passage from a committee report constitutes an affirmative and unmistakable instruction that the CFAA should be applied to extraterritorial conduct, as well as to computers engaged in foreign commerce or and communication, including protected computers located outside the United States. 173 Thus a challenge to the CFAA's jurisdiction could provide a test for the criminal applicability of the most restrictive language in RJR Nabisco. construction is not fairly possible, the intent of Congress-rather than international law-governs, and "the federal statute is controlling as a matter of law." 178 The Supreme Court has also twice invoked the canon of "constru[ing] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations." 179 
D. Success Against the Odds
Despite the practical and legal difficulties, there have been some successful efforts to prosecute and disrupt hacking, the most recent of which involved the use of the Rule 41 amendments.
In April 2017, the Department of Justice announced "an extensive effort to disrupt and dismantle the Kelihos botnet," which it described as "a global network of tens of thousands of infected computers under the control of a cybercriminal that was used to facilitate malicious activities including harvesting login credentials, distributing hundreds of millions of spam emails, and installing ransomware and other malicious software." 180 Pursuant to amended Rule 41, the Department of Justice had obtained a single warrant authorizing it to "redirect Kelihos-infected computers to a substitute server and to record the Internet Protocol addresses of those computers as they connect to the server." 181 This allowed "the government to provide the IP addresses of Kelihos victims to those who can assist with removing the Kelihos malware including internet service providers." 182 Some critics of the Rule 41 amendments were impressed that the government had been protective of individual privacy: it collected only the victims' IP addresses and "non-content" routing and signaling information so Internet Service Providers could notify the victims. 183 Moreover, the court order "limited the government's interactions with victimized computers to commands that block an infected computer from performing malicious activities and communicating with other devices on the botnets," which prohibits the government from seizing any of the contents of victim computers. 184 But other commentators were critical of the government's efforts because they involved invading the victim computers to take corrective actions. 185 To permanently disable the Kelihos botnet, the government had to prevent the victim computers from communicating with other hacker-controlled devices.
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The government also collected sufficient information to attribute the Kelihos botnet to Russian hacker Peter Yuryevish Levashov, who was indicted for CFAA violations and other related charges. 187 In an ironic twist of fate, government investigators finally linked Levashov to the botnet because he had committed the same security lapse that allows cybercriminals to victimize innocent consumers: using the same IP and login credentials on various consumer sites, including Apple and Google. 188 With the cooperation of Spanish authorities, Levashov was arrested in Spain while on holiday, the National Court of Spain ruled that he could be extradited, and he was brought to the United States in February 2018.
V. LEGALIZING HACKING BACK AGAINST BOTNETS
Although the CFAA provides a tool to prosecute hacking in the IoT, given the difficulties implicit in bringing prosecutions under it, other solutions are needed to address the dangers posed by the IoT. This section discusses one such possible solution: remedial action.190 Although remedial actions might sometimes be useful when hackers seek to control an object as discussed in Section III.A., we will focus here on their potential to reduce the threat posed by botnets, where such efforts would have the greatest utility. It is a controversial route, mired in legal, ethical, and practical dilemmas. This section begins by discussing the danger of botnets, the potential benefit of hacking back, and the legal barriers to doing so. It then assesses how hacking back may be legalized, before summarizing some of its primary critiques.
A. The Danger of Botnets and the Allure of Hacking Back
The Botnets have a different relationship to the IoT than many of the other dangers discussed in this article. Much of this article focuses on how the internet may be used to corrupt devices connected to it. 191 In contrast, botnets present the reverse issue: devices connected to the internet may be used to disrupt the internet itself. 192 Compounding the problem, botnets are not only an existential threat to the internet but a persistent one as well. Without curative solutions, botnets can be used in multiple crimes. 193 Once a device is recruited into a botnet, it becomes part of a "commodity" that can be rented out "by the hour" or purchased. 194 Thus, to eliminate the threat of botnets, a solution with retroactive and curative force is needed. Enter hacking back, part of a larger concept of internet self help or remediation encompassing terms such as counterstrikes, "'active defense,' 'back hacking,' 'retaliatory hacking,' or 'offensive countermeasures '" 195 As the assorted terms suggest, remedial action encompasses a range of different self-help measures to prevent and counter botnets and hacking. Remedial actions might "enable attacked parties to detect, trace, and then actively respond to a threat by, for example, interrupting an attack in progress to mitigate damage to the system." 196 Specific strategies could include implementing a "DoS attack at the botnet controller or hacking the botnet controller and thereby taking control of the botnet." 197 However, not all remedial efforts are so forceful: "Hacking back [Vol. 16 against a botnet can be as simple and nonaggressive as pushing security patches onto infected computers, just as patients with a deadly virus could be forcibly treated or quarantined to prevent a contagion's spread."
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Unlike enforcement and litigation which do little to prevent future attacks, and are "inherently ex post facto," 199 hacking back has the crucial ability to prevent future attacks by combatting existing botnets.
Despite these potential benefits, there is also a potential problem. At least if undertaken by private parties, 200 such behaviors may be illegal. 201 Ironically, "[t]he same laws that make it illegal to hack in the first placefor instance, to access someone else's system without authorizationpresumably make it illegal to hack back." 202 The CFAA both criminalizes botnets and limits recourse against them. 203 The Department of Justice, the FBI, and "White House officials" have all suggested that such remedial efforts may be illegal. 204 Scholarship echoes this conclusion. 205 As a result, the legal regime that is intended to protect the public from hacking also limits the manner in which such dangers may be fought. A logical question then, is how hacking back might be legalized. 206 
B. Possible Theories for the Legalization of Hacking Back
There are a variety of ways in which hacking back might be legalized. This subsection focuses primarily on one possibility: creating exceptions for strikebacks through a legal framework modeled on the laws governing recapture of property. It then briefly summarizes other possibilities.
Recapture laws provide a promising framework for remedial action. They balance two conflicting considerations implicated by hacking back: the right to protect personal property, and the understanding that that right cannot be absolute. On the one hand, "[t]he law has always recognized that a person is justified in using some degree of force to protect his property from wrongful invasion or appropriation by another." 207 On the other, the law has been wary of the dangers surrounding self-help measures to regain property. 208 The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides an important compromise of these conflicting interests in the context of recaption of property. Under MPC 3.06(1)(b), "use of force upon or toward the person of another" when protecting property is justifiable if:
[T]he actor believes that such force is immediately necessary . . . to effect an entry or re-entry upon land or to retake tangible movable property provided that the actor believes that he or the person by whose authority he acts or a person from whom he or such other person derives title was unlawfully dispossessed of such land or movable property and is entitled to possession, and provided, further, that:
(i) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such dispossession; or (ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to the possession of the property and, in the case of land, the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be, are of such urgency that it would be an exceptional hardship to postpone the entry or re-entry until a court order is obtained. personal possessions. Applying the test of MPC 3.06, it could be justifiable for Bill to take back his personal property if he believed it "immediately necessary." Jeremy's initial interference with Bill's property rights justifies some resulting intrusion by Bill into Jeremy's rights.
To illustrate how the framework of MPC 3.06 could shape laws governing hacking back, imagine the digital equivalent. Assume that Bill operates a thriving retail and manufacturing business out of his home comprised of a computer, a website, and an internet enabled 3D printer. Jeremy hacks into Bill's computer and steals consumer credit card information stored on it, saving it to his hard drive. Jeremy also controls a sizeable botnet through his personal computer and directs it to launch a DDoS attack on Bill's website, bringing it down. Finally, Jeremy exploits the botnet to gain control of Bill's 3D printer and causes it to malfunction. The basic scenario is the same as in the hypothetical above: Jeremy has interfered with Bill's property. Only the nature of the intrusion is different. Bill still has physical possession of his computer and printer, but Jeremy has wrongfully copied some files, and taken control of the printer. If MPC 3.06 were the framework for hacking back laws, Bill might be able to hack back to erase the stolen files, end the DDoS attack, and regain control of his printer. It is analogous to Bill taking back his physical property above. The basic premise is the same: Jeremy's meddling with Bill's property merits some form of response to restore Bill's property interests.
Of course, there is a fundamental threshold difference between recaption as envisioned by MPC 3.06, and hacking back of the sort contemplated in the Bill and Jeremy example. The MPC right of recaption is not directly relevant to hacking back. It provides a justification for the use of non-deadly force against the person of another, rather than for interference with property, such as a computer within the meaning of the CFAA. Except for the general defense of "choice of evils," the MPC does not address the justification for interference with property. 211 However, the law generally regards any use of force against a person as a more serious wrong than interference with personal property. Therefore, the framework for recaption in MPC 3.06 should be sufficient, as a policy matter, to justify the lesser wrong of interference with personal property.
Such interference already has a close analogy in the context of torts. Although tort law does not permit the use of force for recapture of chattels "once possession is clearly lost," it "permits a defendant who is entitled to immediate possession to recover the goods from another's land (a) if the defendant did not cause the intrusion of the goods in the first place and (b) if entry is reasonable as to both time and manner."
212 For example, "[i]t is not disputed that if . . . [chattels belonging to another] have come upon the land through the wrongful conduct of the landowner, a privilege to enter and recover them exists." 213 In exercising that privilege, "[r]easonable amounts of damage may be done, even to the extent of breaking down a fence or a door . . . The privilege is complete, and, so long as only reasonable force is used, the defendant is not liable for any damage he may do." 214 In some circumstances a person may use force against the physical property of someone who has taken his own property, in the attempt to recapture it. This is particularly instructive in the context of hacking back, because breaking down a thief's door to regain stolen property is similar to hacking back against a digital aggressor to restore a compromised computer.
Allowing for some leeway regarding where force may be directed in recapturing property, the conceptual underpinning of MPC 3.06 fits well with the basic nature of remedial action in the IoT. Reworking is necessary to accommodate the differences between the physical and digital arenas, because they result in somewhat distinct property interests and methods of recaption. A rudimentary sketch of a law governing counterstrikes may be imagined by modifying MPC 3.06(1)(b) to rectify these disparities and to clarify that force may be used against the property of another:
Damage to, intrusion into, or interference with, the computer of another . . . is justifiable when protecting property . . . if the actor believes that such action is immediately necessary . . . to regain control of a computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled device, provided that the actor [reasonably] 215 believes that he or the person by whose authority he acts . . . was unlawfully deprived of control of such computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled device . . . and is entitled to regain control, and provided, further, that: 215 It would be important to consider whether to qualify a defense based on 3.06 with the requirement that the defendant's beliefs be reasonable. M.P.C. Section 3.06 focuses solely on the defendant's subjective belief. But it is qualified by Section 3.09(2), which makes the defense unavailable for certain offenses if the defendant was reckless or negligent in having a belief required for 3.06 or other justification defenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, §3.09 comment 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) .
(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he takes this action has no claim of right to the interference with control of the computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled device . . . ."
This formulation is intended as merely a rough illustration of how the template of recaption law might apply to hacking back, and to further paint the analogy between recapture of physical property and remedial action in the IoT. A comprehensive statute is well beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, an additional consideration demands attention.
MPC 3.06 contains temporal limitations that could greatly hinder an analogous right to hack back. MPC 3.06(1)(b) demands immediacy, requiring a belief of "immediate" necessity, and actions that are "used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such dispossession." 216 These requirements may be impractical in the context of an attack in the IoT because it may be impossible to quickly assess the harm and identify the perpetrator.
217 State laws modifying MPC 3.06 provide models for a more flexible timing requirement. For example, Connecticut allows force for the recapture of personal property "when and to the extent that [the recapturer] reasonably believes such to be necessary . . . to regain property which he reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable time prior to the use of such force." 218 Extending the window in which the victim of a botnet attack may respond from immediacy to reasonableness, as Connecticut does for recaption, could better accommodate a range of remedial actions.
With these modifications to recapture law framework, more aggressive forms of hacking back might be legally permissible. Of course, creating a right of reentry or recapture based on the MPC is just one way that hacking back might be legalized. Other routes have been suggested. For example, one proposal would amend the CFAA to allow a limited selfhelp privilege narrowly cabined by four requirements:
(1) the counterattack must be necessary and proportional to the threat being mitigated or prevented; (2) the counterattack must be in response to an ongoing or repeated attack; (3) the counterattacker must submit a good-faith justification and notification to the government; and (4) the counterattacker must assume strict liability for all damage to third 216 Id. We omitted the MPC language about "fresh pursuit" from our model statute because we are unaware of a digital equivalent for the concept. 217 See Lin, supra note 198, at 15 (observing that quick attribution is inaccurate, and accurate attribution is slow). 218 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-21 (1969).
parties, and liability for all negligently caused unnecessary damage to the original attacker. 219 Amending the CFAA has some proponents in Congress. Indeed, Georgia representative Tom Graves proposed the Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act (ACDC), which would change the CFAA so that it would not apply to victims of cyberattacks who accessed attackers' networks to "gather information in order to establish attribution of criminal activity to share with law enforcement" or to "disrupt continued unauthorized activity against the victim's own network." 220 Others propose a path for legalizing remedial action through analogy to retail security guards, 221 bounty hunters, or private investigators. 222 Under these theories, remedial actions like planting malware in botnets or searching the networks of invaders could be "considered seizure of an offensive weapon" or security patrols, respectively. Other theories have looked to tort law exceptions such as private nuisance, trespass to chattels, 223 "the recapture of chattels privilege, entry upon land to remove chattels, private necessity, or even the castle doctrine." 224 But even if legalizing hacking back under any of these theories would be possible, it is not necessarily a good idea. The next subsection explores the pitfalls.
C. The Ethical and Logistical Problems with Hacking Back
Hacking back has garnered considerable attention in the wake of prominent hacks, 225 but the attention has not all been positive. 226 Critics have highlighted a range of logistical and ethical issues. Logistically, it is unclear that hacking back would be an effective solution even if legalized. One major logistical concern is the danger of escalation. Hacking back may create new attacks rather than end ongoing ones. 227 Two considerations magnify this danger. First, not all hackers will be deterred by remedial action. 228 Some, such as hacktivists, may welcome the challenge and ramp up their attacks. 229 Alternatively, where the initial aggressor is a foreign government or criminal organization, escalated retaliation is likely. 230 American companies engaged in hack backs against such actors will not be able to out-violate the law. 231 Second, companies are not as well-equipped as the government to assess the likelihood of foreign escalation. 232 Disturbingly, a company's remedial action could be perceived by a foreign country as "a military response from our state." 233 Remedial action from an American company could become "the opening volleys of a cyberwar, which could escalate into a physical or kinetic war." 234 Another major logistical concern focuses on the danger that remedial actions could create chaos in the wake of hacks. Some in law enforcement warn that remedial action could "lead to confusion in investigating cyberattacks." 235 Remedial action looks similar to the tools used by the initial aggressors, and makes it "much harder to distinguish between the good guys and the bad guys online." 236 And remedial action could also muddle the judicial recourse for cyberattacks because evidence gained through hacking back may be inadmissible for those bringing suit under the CFAA. 237 One last logistical criticism of remedial action is rooted in the relationship between companies and the cybersecurity firms they may contract with to provide remedial action. Cybersecurity firms are given access to corporate networks and are in the ideal position to steal information from the companies that hired them. 238 Even if outright theft by cybersecurity firms is unlikely, there is a perverse incentive. As one article phrased the relationship: "Would there not be a conflict of interest . . . between treating a problem (ongoing revenue for your security firm) and curing it (which ends their engagement)?" 239 The ethical critiques of remedial action are similarly varied. One focuses on the relationship between private and public that hacking back might fuel. For example, remedial action intrudes on the domain of force against foreign actors that generally belongs to the state. 240 Alternatively, remedial action by private companies presents a danger of government ratification of illegal behavior as in Russia, which is said to rely on "intelligence gathered by criminals, allowing it to benefit from crimes without accepting responsibility for them." 241 Other ethical concerns abound. For example, information security professionals that engage in remedial actions may actually violate the professional code of their licensing agency. 242 Additionally, even if hacking back were to be legalized under U.S. law, it might still "violate foreign laws." 243 Finally, some distinguish hacking back from self-defense because unlike self-defense, the justifying threat is not existential. 244 One last major criticism involves both logistical and ethical dilemmas. For hacking back to work, the entity doing it must be able to identify the perpetrator of the hack. As discussed more fully in Section IV.A., identifying hackers is difficult because they "'like to cover their tracks by routing attacks through other people's computers, without the owners' knowledge." 245 As a result, remedial action is hampered by time and certainty. 246 Quick remedial actions are likely to be uncertain and could be against the wrong party, while accurate attribution is likely to be too slow to be to allow for effective remediation. 247 Ethically, this presents two major problems. First, remedial actions risk collateral damage to innocent parties. Second, the limitations on attribution temper the justification of remedial action as self-defense. Using force against a cyber aggressor is one thing, using it against a victim is another.
When applied to a hypothetical, many of these logistical and ethical critiques are damning. Return one last time to the example of Jeremy's hack. In using Bill and Jeremy to illustrate how recapture of property law might provide a framework for the legalization of hacking back, it was necessary to analogize between the physical world and the digital world as so many accounts of hacking do. 248 But many of the ethical and logistical critiques of remedial action illustrate that such analogies are imperfect, even if plausible. For example, in the Jeremy and Bill example, Bill was able to attribute the attack to Jeremy. That degree of certainty is unlikely in reality, and especially within a short period of time. Second, the hypothetical presented Jeremy and Bill as sharing physical proximity. In the digital age a hacker may be far away, often in another country. The hacker may even be the agent of a foreign government. By hacking back against Jeremy, Bill may have waded into the waters of international aggression and escalation. Alternatively, Jeremy could be an innocent party whose network has been compromised by someone else. He might then mistake Bill's defensive hack back for an initial aggression, and respond with a new attack. Of course, it is unlikely that both parties would be individuals. They could be corporations, governments, criminal organizations, or teams. Perhaps that is most indicative of the core problem: the uncertainty inherent in cyberattacks and the IoT makes solutions simultaneously essential but difficult.
VI. OTHER OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF THE IOT
If remedial actions like hacking back cannot remedy the numerous and grave threats that permeate the era of the IoT, and the CFAA is insufficient, then it is essential to find another way to reduce vulnerabilities and prevent attacks. Although there are many possibilities, 249 this section briefly explores two possible prospective solutions: (1) a standards approach; and (2) agency regulation.
Both solutions differ from remedial actions such as hacking back by focusing more on securing new IoT devices rather than combatting existing ones that have already been corrupted. Both solutions are grounded in the same understanding of the problems with the IoT. Proponents of a standards approach and agency regulation often view the IoT as a victim of a market failure, as Section II illustrates. 250 cheap as possible. 251 Manufacturers and retailers oblige, prioritizing cost over security because they have no incentive not to. 252 International supply chains and the limited security expertise of many IoT design teams further complicate matters. 253 The widespread weaknesses in IoT devices offer an enticing tool and opportunity for nefarious activity. This section evaluates the potential of a standards approach or agency regulation to break this cycle.
A. The Standards Approach
Vulnerabilities like default passwords and static firmware threaten IoT security. Although they are suboptimal, because there is no uniform set of standards that IoT manufacturers or retailers must meet they are not technically substandard. 254 The standards approach would attempt to remedy this by imposing such a system on key players.
A standards system would combat the market failure by incentivizing better security practices in the proliferation of IoT devices. 255 [Vol. 16 Generally, organizations advocating for the use of a standardsbased approach emphasize the importance of a consistent and uniform standard, 260 but the priorities of an IoT security standard might vary. For example, Dale Drew-a proponent of a standards approach-is preoccupied with remedying vulnerabilities like default passwords, "hard-coded credentials," and the "lack of capability of updating [IoT device] firmware." 261 One bipartisan legislative attempt at employing a standards approach, titled "The Internet of Things Cybersecurity Act of 2017," is currently pending before Congress. 262 The Bill would apply to IoT devices sold to the federal government, and "requires that manufacturers that sell smart devices to government agencies regularly patch their products for vulnerabilities and steer clear from using hard-coded passwords to access the devices via a backdoor." 263 Assuming arguendo that agreement could be reached on the correct standards, this approach would still have a serious limitation: it would not affect the millions of existing devices.
B. Agency Regulation
Some experts have concluded that the pervasive threats to the IoT, and the related market failure, require increased government involvement. 264 They argue that "[c]ybersecurity ought to be a public good much like automobile safety." 265 One possibility is to expand the capabilities of existing government agencies to test IoT security. To promote automobile safety, there are federally funded research and development centers, testing facilities run by the National Transportation Safety Board (post market), automotive crash safety testing (premarket), and the Nevada National Security Site 260 See Standard for an Architectural Framework for the Internet of Things, IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION (2017), https://standards.ieee.org/develop/project/ 2413.html ("The adoption of a unified approach to the development of IoT systems will reduce industry fragmentation and create a critical mass of multi-stakeholder activities around the world."). 261 Drew, supra note 23, at 2. 262 Harold Stark, A Bipartisan Bill to Strengthen Cybersecurity for the Internet of Things, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldstark/2017/ 08/20/a-bipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-cybersecurity-for-the-internet-ofthings/#7eb1d0675a5f. 263 Id. 264 See Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 43 ("The choice is not between government involvement and no government involvement, but between smart government involvement and stupid government involvement."). 265 Fu, supra note 8, at 8 (destruction and survivability testing). 266 But no analogous regulatory entities or research facilities currently exist to provide a proving ground for embedded cybersecurity defenses needed by IoT. 267 Such facilities would remedy the government's lack of a means to "conduct thorough security testing and assessment on IoT devices" and would reduce the inefficiencies of having diffuse entities conducting independent research.
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This expansion could potentially fall under the control of the National Science Foundation or the NIST.
269
Another possibility is the creation of a new regulatory agency. Bruce Schneier advocates for this position and analogizes the IoT to the once-new technologies of the past that gave rise to new agencies: "trains, cars, airplanes, radio, and nuclear power."
270 He argues that "[i]n the world of dangerous things, we constrain innovation," 271 and that the IoT presents new dangers just as those earlier technologies did during their development. As a result, even if regulation would stifle some creativity, Schneier suggests that this is a necessary sacrifice for security. 272 Furthermore, the IoT presents problems that the market cannot or will not solve on its own. The most prominent is the market failure and the lack of consumer and manufacturer incentives to resolve technological vulnerabilities in the IoT. 273 Schneier argues that-as with environmental pollution-regulation is essential because the dangers and ill effects are felt only downstream. 274 In the current political environment, which favors smaller government and reducing regulation, it seems doubtful that this approach could get traction in Congress. And if it did so, recruiting the necessary expertise and resources could be a daunting task.
CONCLUSION
The dangers in the IoT are complex, multifaceted, and numerous; and none of the possible solutions discussed in this article is wholly satisfying. For example, the current legal regime under the CFAA governs many of the threats in the IoT, and there have been some successful prosecutions under it. However, the CFAA's utility is severely limited by 266 Id. at 3. 267 Id. 268 Id. at 8-9. 269 See Fu Testimony, supra note 22, at 35 (advocating for increased support for these agencies). 270 See Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 31. 271 Id. at 59. 272 See id. ("So, yes, this is going to constrain innovation . . . but this is what we do when innovation can cause catastrophic risk."). 273 Id. at 58. 274 Id.
practical and jurisdictional concerns, and it also prohibits some remedial actions against hacking. Similar contradictions are apparent with the alternative solutions evaluated in this article. Remedial actions like hacking back could ameliorate the perils of botnets, but they suffer from legal, ethical, and practical drawbacks. A standards approach might help secure the IoT prospectively, but it does nothing to eliminate the threat posed by preexisting botnets and compromised IoT devices. Agency regulation might provide similar relief, but seems unlikely in the current political climate.
Given these obstacles, it is tempting to do nothing, despite the overwhelming and quickly accelerating dangers posed by the IoT. That would be the worst option of all. First, an absence of official action should not be mistaken for an absence of action. If the government does not act to secure the IoT, others will, and the results could be chaotic and perilous. This inevitability may already be occurring: self-appointed vigilante "white hat" hackers are suspected in the proliferation of three botnets. One, known as Hajime, "has infected at least 10,000 home routers, network-connected cameras, and other so-called Internet of Things devices" with the apparent goal of "disrupt[ing] Mirai and similar IoT botnets." 275 Even assuming that the vigilante hackers have good intentions, their solution is fleeting, the methodology is illegal, and it interferes with "tens of thousands of devices" without the permission of their owners. 276 The other botnets, known as "BrickerBot.1" and "BrickerBot.2" may have a similar goal, but are particularly destructive: they are "designed to damage routers and other Internet-connected appliances so badly that they become effectively inoperable." 277 If these developments are any indication, without official intervention, the fight to secure the IoT could become a war of attrition with many innocent victims.
Second, the extraordinary growth of the IoT and its extreme vulnerability threaten individuals, businesses, and the broader society. Insecure IoT devices may be corrupted and exploited to attack the internet itself, threatening our reliance on the internet for things such as finance, news, healthcare, education, communication, information storage, and more. 278 Alternatively, IoT devices present new and unique opportunities for malicious actors to turn digital hacking into physical consequences.
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Hackers can already jeopardize a frightening array of internet-enabled objects including cars, trains, voting machines, power plants, dams, home thermostats, implanted medical devices, and possibly airplanes. 280 With ever-increasing internet connectivity, the perils could implicate any device that is connected to the internet. In the face of these potentially crippling threats, action is essential. If we wait passively for the full array of dangers of the IoT to become a reality, the wait will not be long, and the crisis could be severe.
